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Toal: Surface Water in South Carolina

SURFACE WATER IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Surface water,' unlike water in a watercourse, is generally
deemed a liability rather than an asset.2 As a result, three basic
rules governing the disposal of unwanted surface water have
emerged. There are, of course, modifications of each rule. The
three rules are the common enemy or common law rule, the civil
law rule, and the reasonable use or modified civil law rule.
Under the common law rule, surface water is regarded
as a common enemy, and every landed proprietor has
the right to take any measure necessary to the protection of his own property from its ravages, even if in
doing so he throws it back upon a coterminous proprietor to his damage ....
This rule is apparently derived from the notion that each landowner has the right to unrestrained use of his land.4 The civil
law rule is "that the landowner has the duty to receive surface
flows from above his land, and he has the corresponding right
'
to have the water flow from his land to land below it."
The
third rule, and the more desirable rule,( is the reasonable use
rule.
The rule is that in effecting a reasonable use of his
land for a legitimate purpose a landowner, acting in
good faith, may drain his land of surface waters and
cast them as a burden upon the land of another,... if
(a) there is a reasonable necessity for such drainage;
(b) if reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the burden; (c) if the utility
or benefit accruing to the land drained reasonable outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the land
1. The more specific term "diffused surface water" is often preferred by
authorities because all waters on the surface of the earth is technically
surface water. See, e.g., 1 WATER AND WATERS CoURsES § 52.1(A) (1967) ;
Dolson, Diffused Surface Water and Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines in
Conflict, 1966 Wisc. L. REv. 58.
2. This is not the invariable rule and problems often arise over the
appropriation of surface Water. See Dolson supra note 1, at 59-92. These
problems are beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Edwards v. Charlotte, C. & A.R.R., 39 S.C. 472, 475, 18 S.E. 58 (1893).
4. Cass v. Dick, 14 Wash. 75, 44 P. 113 (1896).
5. 1 WATER AND WATER COURSES § 52.1, at 305 (1967).
6. See W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964).
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receiving the burden; and (d) if, where practicable, it
is accomplished by reasonably improving the normal
and natural system of drainage according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or if, in the absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable and feasible artifi7
cial drain is used.
Both the common law and civil law rules have been criticized
as too harsh,8 and courts recognizing, if not articulating, this
fact have grafted exceptions on these rules. This paper will
examine the South Carolina law of surface water, laying particular emphasis on exceptions to the common enemy doctrine.
II. SouTH

CARoIJNA's

CO

O

ENmmy Ruim

A. Adoption
South Carolina first adopted the common enemy rule in the
form stated above in Edwards v. Charlotte, Columbia 6 Augusta Railroad in 1893. The court, in adopting this rule, rejected the analogy in an earlier case requiring reasonable use
of fire on one's own property 10 and another analogy in two
earlier cases requiring non-negligent obstruction of a natural
watercourse. 1 ' The court felt itself bound to adopt the common enemy rule by a statute which continued the common
law of England in full force. 12 The common enemy rule, however, was a doctrine developed in Massachusetts and was never
in force in England, 1 3 and it has been claimed that the civil
law rule was really the English common law.' 4 The rule has
been reiterated many times since, however, and it is highly unlikely that this mistake will ever be remedied.
B. Definition of Surface Water
The common enemy rule applies only to surface water. The
negligent obstruction of a natural water course is actionable if
7. Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 167-68, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1948).
8. See, e.g., Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Water 24
MINN. L. REv. 891 (1940).

9. 39 S.C. 472, 18 S.E. 58 (1893).
10. Gregory v. Layton, 36 S.C. 93, 15 S.E. 352 (1892).
11. Wallace v. Columbia, C. & A.R.R., 34 S.C. 62, 12 S.E. 815 (1891);
Mills v. Greenville & C.R.R., 13 S.C. 97 (1880).
12. Edwards v. Charlotte, C. & A.R.R., 39 S.C. 472, 474-75, 18 S.E. 58
(1893).
13. IA G. THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 266 at 365 (1964); Kegs v. Romley, 50 Cal. Reptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529 (1966). But see Cross, Ground Waters
in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 149 (1953).
14. 1A G. TnompsoN, REAL PROPERT § 266, at 365 (1964).
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it results in damage to an adjoining proprietor. 15 It becomes
important then to distinguish between surface water and water
in a natural water course. Surface waters have been defined
positively as:
waters of a casual and vagrant character, which ooze
through the soil, or diffuse or squander themselves over
the surface, following no definite course. They are
waters which though customarily and naturally flowing in a known direction and course, have nevertheless
no banks or channels in the soil, and include waters
which are diffused over the surface of the ground, and
are dervied from rains and melting snows, occasional
outburst of water, which at times of freshet or melting
of snows descend from the mountain and innundate
the country; and the moisture of the wet, spong or
boggy ground. 18
On the other hand the court has said that the "[d]istinguishing
features of surface waters are purely negative, and consist in the
absence of the distinguishing features which are common to
all water courses."1 7 A water course, the court continued was:
a stream usually flowing in a particular direction,
though it need not flow continually. It may sometimes
be dry. It must flow in a definite channel, having a bed,
sides or banks, and it naturally discharges itself into
some other stream or body of water. It must be something more than mere surface drainage over the entire
face of a tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets
or other extraordinary causes. 18
Parties to actions have from time to time seized on certain

characteristics which they felt ought to be conclusive on the
question of whether the water involved was surface water or a
part of a natural watercourse. The presence of a large amount
of water is not conclusive that there is a watercourse. 10 Nor
15. E.g., Johnson v. Williams, 338 S.C. 623, 121 S.E. 2d 223 (1961);

Touchberry v. Northwestern R.R, 83 S.C. 315, 65 S.E. 341 (1909); Lampley

v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 71 S.C. 156, 50 S.E. 773 (1905); Jones v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 67 S.C. 181, 45 S.E. 188 (1903) ; Lawton v. South Bound
Ry., 61 S.C. 548, 39 S.E. 752 (1901); Wallace v. Columbia, C. & A.R.R., 34
S.C. 62, 12 S.E. 815 (1891).
16. Brandenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S.C. 18, 21, 39 S.E. 790 (1901), quoling
from 24 ENCY. OF LAW 896. This passage also quoted in Lawton v. South
Bound R.R., 61 S.C. 548, 552, 39 S.E. 752 (1901).
17. Lawton v. South Bound R.R., 61 S.C. 548, 552, 39 S.E. 752 (1901).
18. Id. at 552-53.

19. Bradenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S.C. 18, 39 S.E. 790 (1901).
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does the presence of catfish indicate that the water involved is
part of a watercourse in view of "the well-established habit of
certain species of the family of traveling long distances over
dryland."20 The presence of a ditch has been held both conclusive and not conclusive of the presence of surface water. In
Lawton v. South Bound Railr'oad21 the court stated that "cer-

tainly a ditch-a purely artificial channel-cannot with any
propriety be regarded as a natural watercourse."2 2 But in
Johnson v. Williams2 3 the court found that a ditch was carry-

ing water in a natural watercourse. The ditch in this case was
cut as a canal between two natural bodies of water.
The characterization of flood water from a stream or other
natural body of water can be difficult. South Carolina has
drawn the line in this fashion:
[Tihe flood water of a river is not usually surface
water, although spread out over the adjacent lands ....
"Whether the water from the overflow of streams is
to be considered as still a part of the watercourse or to
be treated as surface water, is the subject of diverse
opinions; but the most satisfactory rule which has been
evolved makes its character depend upon the configuration of the country and the relative position of the
water after it has gone beyond the usual channel. If
the flood water becomes severed from the main current
or leaves the same never to return, and spreads out over
the lower ground it becomes surface water. But if it
forms a continuous body with the water flowing in the
ordinary channel, or if it departs from such channel
presently to return, as by recession of the waters, it is
to be regarded as still part of the stream." 24
C. The Nuisance Efception
The court which had laid down the harsh common enemy
rule was quick to mount exceptions on it. The first of these
exceptions to the
right to deal with [surface water] in any such manner
as he may see fit, is that it is subject to the general law
in regard to nuisances, if its accumulation has become
20. Riverbank v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 124 S.C. 136, 142, 117 S.E. 206
(1923).
21. 61 S.C. 548, 39 S.E. 752 (1901).
22. Id. at 555.

23. 238 S.C. 623, 121 SE. 2d 223 (1961).
24. Jones v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 67 S.C. 181, 198, 45 S.E. 188 (1903).
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a nuisance per se, as for example, whenever it has become dangerous at all times and under all circumstances to life or property. 2
The case which laid down this exception, Baltzeger v. Carolina
Midland Railway,28 set almost impossible standards for its use.
The plaintiff in the case has alleged that the railroad in building its line had built up a high embankment which stopped the
flow of surface water. This surface water had gathered on the
railroad's land, stagnated, and allegedly emitted gasses which
poisoned and polluted air, eventually causing the death of the
plaintiff's daughter. The court found the allegations insufficient to show a nuisance per se.27 This required a finding
that the stagnant water was not "dangerous at all times and
under all circumstance to life, health and property." 28 The
court then indicated that, even though the stagnant water was
not a nuisance per se, recovery might be had if it were shown
that the nuisance was a private as opposed to a public one. This
in turn would have required a showing of special damage to the
plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff's daughter had died was
not different "in kind, as well as degree, from those injuries
which [might] be reasonably expected, [would] be sustained by
the public generally."2 9 Thus the plaintiff's allegation was
insufficient as a nuisance per se because the pond was not dangerous to everyone and was insufficient as a private nuisance
because it was as dangerous to everyone as it was his daughter.
This case formed a formidable precedent against recovery on
the nuisance theory. It was soon joined by another"0 in which
the plaintiff alleged a railroad had obstructed his drainage.
The plaintiff tried to show special damages, apparently to
come under the nuisance exception.8 1 The court held that any
elements of special damage would have been considered in the
highway condemnation award. The next two cases 32 involved
the obstruction of the drainage of surface water. In neither
case was the flooding of the plaintiff's land sufficient allega25. Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., 54 S.C. 242, 247, 32 S.E. 348 (1899).

26.
27.
28.
29.

54 S.C. 242, 32 S.E. 358 (1899).
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 250.

30. Johnson v. Southern Ry., 71 S.C. 241, 50 S.E. 775 (1905).
31. See the cases cited for the respondent in the South Carolina Reports at

71 S.C. 241, 241-42.

32. Banks v. Southern Ry., 126 S.C. 241, 118 S.E. 923 (1923); Riverbank
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 124 S.C. 136, 117 S.E. 206 (1923).
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tion of a nuisance per se. In the later caseP3 a public nuisance
with special damage to the plaintiff was not made out by an
allegation that the public road was flooded, because there was
no showing that the overflowing of the highway contributed
to the plaintiff's damage.
It would have seemed unlikely from a review of these cases
that a proprietor whose land was flooded would be allowed to
recover under the nuisance exception. In Deason v. Souther
Railway8 4 however the court upheld a judgment for the plain
tiff on the nuisance theory. The plaintiff was the upper riparian and complained of the defendant's obstruction of a drainage ditch. The trial judge had charged that "you can back the
water and protect yourself; and you cannot back it on another
person's land, on another's land, and in such a way as to create
a nuisance and destroy his property."3 5 The court said that
"[i]t would be hard to find a clearer or fairer statement of the
law .
,,'"6
In deciding whether the charge was applicable to
the facts the court quoted from Wood on Nuisanoe to the effect
that "[e]very citizen holds his property subject to the implied
obligation that he will use it in such a way as not to prevent
others from enjoying the use of their property." 37 This portion
of the opinion standing alone would have put South Carolina in
the group of states having the reasonable use rule. The court,
however, went on to hold that the plaintiff had a prescriptive
easement to maintain the ditch. It is unclear whether the easement in addition to the nuisance was a requisite to recovery. 8
Although subsequent cases mention the nuisance exception, 9
plaintiffs apparently have not relied on Deason, preferring to
rely on the "casting in concentrated form" exception.40
There is authority that stagnant surface water constitutes a
nuisance. The court in Bowin 'v. George41 held that an allegation that stagnant water was accumulating in a junk yard
stated a cause of action on a private nuisance. The court said
that "we fail to see how the law relating to the handling of
33. Banks v. Southern Ry., 126 S.C. 241, 118 S.E. 923 (1923).

34. 142 S.C. 328, 140 S.E. (575 (1927).
35. Id. at 334.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 335.
38. Justice Cothran in dissent showed a better command of precedent, if

not a feel for the more desirable rule.

39. See, e.g., Fairey v. Southern Ry., 162 S.C. 129, 160 S.E. 274 (1931)
Garmany v. Southern Ry., 152 S.C. 205, 149 S.E. 765 (1929).
40. See infra § D.
41. 239 S.C. 429, 123 S.E.2d 528 (1962).
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surface water has any application.142 The Baitzeger case was
distinguished on the basis that the surface water was collected
within the city limits and was thus a public nuisance. Other
than this questionable distinction, the case is salutory as it
views surface water from the nuisance (tort) aspect rather
than clothing it with immutable property characteristiag.
D. The Casting in Concentrated Form Exception
The second exception which grew up to the common enemy
rule was that, "whatever else may be done with surface water,
the proprietor whose land it has reached cannot divert it from
its natural course and cast it in a body on an adjoining proprietor."4 3 The rule has come to be stated in this form: "[11t
is actionable injury, for a person to collect surface water, into
an artificial channel, and cast it on another's land, in concentrated form.144 The exception seems clearly aimed at upper
proprietors, and indeed the court in enunciating the rule quoted
a New York case which stated that "[t]here is a distinction between casting water upon another's land and preventing the
flow of surface water upon your own." 45 The exception rests
on the notion that surface water becomes the property of the
owner and that he cannot dispose of his property to the injury
of his neighbor.4" There is no suggestion why water in a concentrated form is any more the property of a proprietor than
other surface water. The exeception is theoretically opposed,
therefore, to the common enemy rule which views the surface
water as an intruder.
The exception as applied to the upper riparian reached its
broadest acceptance in Garmany v. Southern Railway.4 7 The
railroad had removed some dirt from its right-of-way so that
land which formerly drained another way went over the plaintiff's land. The court said that the "artificial channel need not
necessarily extend to the line or edge of the injured person's
lands, . . . but must extend to such a point that the surface

water conveyed therein or thereby results in injury to such person's land or health."48 As the dissent pointed out, this de42. Id. at 433.

43. Brandenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S.C. 18, 23, 39 S.E. 790 (1901).
44. Riverbank v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 124 S.C. 136, 141, 117 S.E. 206
(1923).
45. Brandenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S.C. 18, 22, 39 S.E. 790 (1901).
46. Id. at 23-24.
47. 152 S.C. 205, 149 S.E. 765 (1929).
48. Id. at 208.
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cision comes close to reversing the principle that the upper
proprietor can fight off surface water. One caveat for lower
riparians exists. In Kirland Distributing Co. v. Seaboard Airline Railway,49 the plaintiff was unable to invoke the exception
to the common enemy rule because he had contracted with the
defendant to build the spur which caused the damage.
Lower proprietors are within the reach of this rule, also.50
The situation which arises most often is the obstruction of a
ditch by the lower riparian. The problem is that it is the upper
riparian who collects the surface water. The volume of the
water backed up depends on the amount of water sent on to
the lower riparian's land. And the lower riparian could avoid
any liability 5 ' by placing the obstruction at the beginning of
his property. If he did that, no court could say he had collected
surface water and cast it in concentrated form on the upper
proprietor.
E. Negligence and Reasonable Use
In two cases the South Carolina court has come close to using
tort concepts to govern surface water cases. The first was the
Deasain case mentioned above 52 which laid down a test for reasonable use. As discussed, the case's authority is doubtful. In
Touchberry v. Northwestern Railroad5 3 the court allowed punitive damages when the railroad knew it was injuring the plaintiff by casting surface water on his land. This was "a conscious
disregard of the plaintiff's rights.154
In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, negligence
and reasonable use concepts have been rejected. In Cannon v.
5 5 the court stated that "the prinAtlantic Coast Line Railroad
ciple is the same whether the roadbed was negligently constructed or not.""5 At an earlier time the court had said that "a
person dealing with surface water on his own land is not bound
to exercise reasonable care, with regard to the rights of other
49. 109 S.C. 331, 96 S.E. 122 (1918).
SO. E.g., Slater v. Price, 96 S.C. 245, 80 S.E. 372 (1913). Cf. Fairey v.
Southern Ry., 162 S.C. 129, 160 S.E. 274 (1931). But see Garmany v.
Southern Ry., 152 S. C. 205, 149 S.E. 765 (1929) (dissenting opinion).
51. Absent, of course, a prescriptive easement. This easement can be obtained in the same manner as any other easement. The discussion of this easement is beyond the scope of this paper.
52. See text at note 33 supra.
53. 88 S.C. 47, 70 S.E. 424 (1911).
54. Id. at 54.
55. 97 S.C. 233, 81 S.E. 476 (1913).
56. Id. at 237. Accord Ganmany v. Southern Ry., 152 S.C. 205, 149 S.E.
765 (1929).
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landowners." 57 The rejection of negligence and reasonable use
is consitent with the common enemy doctrine but makes increasingly poorer sense as South Carolina becomes less agrarian.58
III.

uIABILITY or THE STATE

Fon "TAxiNG"

One further aspect of surface water law should be examined.
The state is cloaked in its garb of sovereign immunity. With
respect to damage caused by surface water, this immunity has
been a liability rather than an asset. The South Carolina court,
in combatting the injustices of sovereign immunity, laid out
liberal rules in construing article I, section 17 of the South
Carolina Constitution which reads: "Private property shall
not be taken ...for public use without just compensation being
first made therefor." This provision has been construed to
include damage caused by the state with surface water.
The earliest cases against the sovereign for surface water
damages were brought under the "defect in the streets" provision.59 Mayrant v. City of Colunbia ° allowed recovery under
this provision using language which spoke of a division of
governmental and administrative functions. This case was later
"distinguished, modified or overruled," 61 and put on the possible
basis of "taking". The case which did so apparently laid to rest
the "defect in the street" approach by requiring that the injury
be incurred in the use of the street for street purposes.0 2 Nevertheless, plaintiffs continued to allege that their damage from
surface water was due to a defect in the streets. 3 It would
seem that the allegations under a "defect" statute would have
to constitute a tort if performed by a private person. It will be
seen that no such limitations attach to allegations of a "taking"
for public use, and no off-setting disadvantages to the latter
action can be conjured up by the author.
57. Touchberry v. Northwestern R.R., 87 S.C. 415, 424, 69 S.E. 877 (1911).
Accord Riverbank v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 124 S.C. 136, 117 S.E. 206
(1923) ; Lawton v. South Bound R.R., 61 S.C. 548, 39 S.E. 752 (1901).
58. Some states have adopted different rules for rural and urban areas. See
1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.1 (1967).
59. Now S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-70 (1962).
60. 77 S.C. 281, 57 S.E. 857 (1907). See also McNinch v. City of Columbia, 128 S.C. 54, 122 S.E. 403 (1924) (grounds for recovery not stated).
61. Triplett v. City of Columbia, 111 S.C. 7, 18, 96 S.E. 675 (1918).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E2d 597 (1967) (involving
gas rather than water damage).
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Faust v. Richiand County 4 was a case in which the highway
department allegedly negligently obstructed a drain and caused
great quantities of water to flood the plaintiff's yard. The
court sat en banc, and the report is as confusing as it is long.
The majority implied that, for the plaintiff to recover, it would
be necessary for the government to commit an act for which it
would be liable if it were a private individual. The majority
felt that the complaint stated a cause of action under the casting
in concentrated form exception. The dissent thought that since
the action of the state was "the exercise of a legal right, and
not the commission of a wrong, . .. it [was] impossible to make
out of it a taking or damage without compensation .... 165
The dissent differed from the majority only as to whether the
complaint would have made out a cause of action against an
individual. Both prior66 and subsequent (7 cases allowed damages for "taking" when the injury was inflicted by the obstruction of a navigable stream. Until Milhous v. State Highway
Department,6" the question of whether the government had to
commit an act for which a private individual would be liable
prior to liability for a taking had never been decided. In that
case the government had obstructed surface drainage in such
a way that an individual, acting similarly, would not have been
liable. The court held the "[the constitutional provision] creates
a right in the citizen to compensation for property taken for
public use unfettered by limitations of the rules of the common
law applicable under similar circumstances to the liability of
an individual." 69
The right having been established, all that remained was to
define the limits of the doctrine. The state or other sovereigns
have sought to avoid liability for a taking because (1) the
taking was not for public purposes, (2) there was no permanency of damage, (3) there was no positive or aggressive act of
the state, or (4) the activity of the state did not contribute to
the damage. Of these, only the fourth is a viable alternative for
the state presently. In discussing these four defenses, some
cases not involving surface water will be used. This will be a
64. 117 S.C. 251, 109 S.E. 151 (1921).
65. Id. at 283.

66. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911).
67. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157

S.E.2d 842 (1931).
68. 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E2d 852 (1940).
69. Id. at 43.
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distinction of no consequence as the fact that surface water is
involved is immaterial in "taking" cases.
In cases involving the flooding of private land, the public
generally has no interest in seeing that land inundated. It
would seem, then, that no taking for public use would have
occurred. This objection was raised and rejected in Lindsay V.
City of Greenville." The court said that
[tihe taking or damaging of property to the extent
that is reasonably necessary to the maintenance and
operation of other property devoted to a public use is,
likewise, a taking or damaging for a public use.7 1
The second and third defense relied on by the state were set
out in Collins v. City of Greenville.7 2 That case involved damage to a home when the city sewerage system backed up. The
court denied recovery under the "taking" theory stating that
"there was no taking for a public used which is permanent ...
and growing out of [a] positive act of the [defendant].17 3 The
positive act requirement is easily met in the normal surface
water case as the building or maintenance of a road is such a
74
positive act.

Naturally, if a person's land is flooded by causes not attributable to the state, the state is not liable for a taking. The
burden on the complaining party is to show that the action by
the state is "the real factor, or at least a participating one."70 ,
This standard makes it relatively easy for the plaintiff to get
to the jury, but the state has been successful in obtaining a
directed verdict.7 6
IV.

CON cLUSION

Surface water law in South Carolina is in a confused state.
For almost any given factual situation involving damage by
the surface water, a carefully drawn complaint will be sufficient
under at least one or more decisions. Unfortunately, the complaint is just as likely to be unsound under other decisions.
WmizAm T. ToAI
70. 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 232 (1966).
71. Id. at 239.
72. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E. 2d 704 (1958).

73. Id. at 509, quoting from Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8

S.E2d 871 (1940).
74. See, e.g., Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E2d 597 (1967).

75. Baynham v. State Highway Dep't, 181 S.C. 435, 187 S.E. 528 (1936).
76. See, e.g., Lail v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 244 S.C. 237,
136 S.E2d 306 (1964).
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